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PRIC E WATERHOUSE,

v.

Petitioner,

ANN B. HOP KIN S,

Respondent.
On Wri t of Cer tior ari to the
Uni ted Stat es Cou rt of App eals
for the Dis trict of Col umb ia Circ uit

BRI EF FOR THE; AMERICAN FED
ERA T'ION OF
LABOR AND CONGRESS OF IND UST
RIA L
ORGANIZATIONS AS AM ICU S CUR
IAE
IN SUPPORT OF RES PON DEN T

Thi s brie f amicus curiae is filed by
the Am eric an
Fed erat ion of Lab or and Congress of
Ind ustr ial Org aniza tion s ( AFL -CI O), a fede rati on of
90 nati ona l and
inte rnat iona l labo r orga niza tion s hav ing
a tota l mem bership of app roxi mat ely 13,000,000
wor king men and
women, with •the consent of the part ies
as provided for in
this Cou rt's rules.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

r

Thi s proceeding, con trar y to Pric e Wat
erho use' s content ion, is a rela tive ly stra ight forw
ard mixed motive
case und er Titl e VII of the Civil Rig
hts Act of 1964,
432 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.: .the dist rict
cou rt's findings,
reviewed and app rove d by the cou rt of
appeals, esta blis h
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that sex-based considerations were given significant, negative weight in the promotion review process which led to
denying plaintiff a partnership.
The issue directly before this Court concerns the placement and the nature of the burden of proof on the question whether the disadvantage the plaintiff suffered in
the promotion evaluation process in the end made a difference in producing the decision to deny her a partnership. As Price Waterhouse recognizes, however, it
facilitates analysis first to delineate the necessary components of a Title VII cause of action.
1. The language and structure of both of the principal
substantive sections of Title VII, §§703(a)(l) & (2),
as interpreted in this Court's cases, convincingly support
the conclusion that an employee evaluation system biased
against women violates Title VII without regard to the
precise impact of that bias on each particular decision.
The "because of . . . sex" language in those sections of
the statute does not indicate otherwise; that language is
best read as requiring that a discriminato ry consideration
be a basis for the challenged employment practice; when
that practice is a decision-making process that weighs
gender as a negative consideration, the requisite motivational element is self-evident.
2. This construction of Title VII comports with and
is essential to further the statute's basic policies. Title
VII's high purpose is to assure that discriminato ry factors do not play a role in the distribution of benefits and
privileges in the workplace. It is self evident that permitting employers to incorporate sex-based factors in their
decisionmaking process as long as no determinativ e impact on any particular employment decision can be proven
frustrates that purpose.
3. This Court's cases in analogous areas support the
conclusion that a cause of action for violation of a rule
requiring a fair and even-handed decision-making process

3
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can be made out without demonstrating that the tainted
aspect of the process in fact accounted for the negative
decision. Where such causes of action are recognized, the
issue of the connection between the impermissible aspect
of the process and the result becomes a problem at the
relief but not the liability stage; once liability for an
illegal decision-making process is established, the burden
of proof as to whether the same result would have occurred through a proper system is placed on the defendant.
4. Nothing in contemporary tort law regarding causation detracts from the foregoing analysis. Rather, modern tort doctrine in large part parallels that analysis, by
recognizing liability whenever culpable conduct is a "substantial factor" in bringing about the harm protected
against, by focussing on policy questions in defining that
harm and the requisite causal connection to the culpable
conduct, and by shifting to the defendant the burden of
proof as to causation when it is unfair, on policy grounds,
to place that burden upon innocent plaintiffs.

f

5. Once it is established that an employer commits a
Title VII violation by following a biased decision-making
process, the conclusion that the burden falls upon the
employer to avoid make whole relief in a particular case
by proving that there was no economic injury traceable
to its illegal act follows a fortiori . As the party that
created both the risk tJhat a discriminatory factor would
be determinative and the risk that the precise impact of
such a mental factor would be very difficult to reconstruct after the fact, it is appropriate, as this Court has
held in analogous cases, to place the risk of an error in
the judicial fact-finding process upon the wrongdoer.
Moreover, while this Court has not previously explicitly
so held, as a practical matter decision-makers have recognized that given the hypothetical and psychological nature
of the issue at the relief stage, it is appropriate to insist
that the employer meet its affirmative burden through

4

objective,
well that
result be
stand ard
ments.

reliable kinds of evidence, and to requi re as
the likelihood that the illicit facto r affected the
very small. A "clea r and convincing" evidence
captu res and succinctly states those require-

ARGUMENT
Introduction

(a) The defen dant Price-Waterhouse, an accounting
firm, has a collegial decision-making system for admi tting
employees to the partn ership . The distri ct court found
that this system gave subst antial weigh t to "comments
influenced by sexual stereotypes" and in that way "inject [ed] stereotyped assumptions about women into the
selection process." Pet. App. 57a, 58a. That court concluded that "the Policy Board 's decision not to admi t the
plaint iff to partn ershi p was tainte d by discri minat ory
evalu ation s;" the employer's decision was the "dire ct
resul t" of "the maint enanc e of a system that gave weigh t
to such biased critic isms" and "that made evaluations
based on 'outmoded attitu des' determ inativ e." Pet. App.
56a, 58a-59a.
Price Waterhouse argue s that the distri ct court 's findings are insufficient to demo nstrat e that sex-based considera tions played any role at all in the decisional process
that produced the promotion decision adverse to the plaintiff. According to the employer "the only evidence of
'mixed motives' was the presence of an intuit ively divined
element of sexual stereo typin g in the atmosphere." Pet.
Br. at 43.
The distri ct court 's conclusion that the decision at issue
here was infected by sexual stereo typin g was not "intu itively divined", but was based instead on consideration
of the evidence before that court. The court of appeals
reviewed at length (Pet. App. 10a-17a) the evidence supportin g that conclusion, notin g that the distri ct court 's
finding was based upon not only the exper t evidence on

5
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sex stereotyp ing but also upon the comments made about
the plaintiff herself and about other women candidat es
for partnersh ip as part of the evaluatio n system. Based
upon that review, the court of appeals concluded that the
district court's finding in this regard was not "clearly
erroneous", since "there is ample support in the record
for the District Court's finding that the partners hip selection process at Price Waterho use was impermis sibly infected by stereotypical attitudes towards female candidates." Pet. App. 12a, 17a. The court of appeals therefore performe d properly its task of reviewing the district
court's factual findings in 1:Jhis regard. Anderson v. City
of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564 ( 1985) ; Pullman Standard v.
Swint, 456 U.S. 273 ( 1982) .1
The district court found, moreover, that sex stereotyping was not simply "in the atmosphe re" but in Price
Waterhouse's promotion system, and that this stereotyping had a "direct" impact on the negative evaluatio n of
the plaintiff for partnersh ip. Again, the court of appeals
reviewed this finding carefully ( Pet. App. 20a) , and concluded that while the plaintiff "has not demonstr ated the
exact impact that stereotyped comments had on the
Board's ultimate decision", there was "ample support for
[the district court's] conclusion that stereotyp ing played
a significant role in blocking plaintiff' s admission to the
partnersh ip." Pet. App. 20a (emphasis supplied ).
Whether the court of appeals was correct in this regard
or not presents, once again, only a question of the adequacy of the court of appeal's review of the district court's
fact findings. And, once again, it appears that the court
1 While we
address the point we note that the propriety o.f the
court of appeals' review of the district court's factual findings is. a
question not fairly encompass ed within the question presented for
review (Pet. Br. I), and one with which this Court in any event
rarely concerns itself. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Co., 336
U.S. 271, 275 (1949); R. Stern, E. Gressman & S. Shapiro, Supreme
Court Practice, 347 (1986).

r
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of appeals proceeded properly with respect to this factual
review issue.
(b) Thus, despite Price Waterhouse's protestations to
the contrary (Pet. Br. at 42-50), as the court of appeals
recognized this is "a case of mixed motivation [because]
. . . [ t] he District Court simply found that both plaintiff's
personality and the sexually stereotyped reactions to her
personality were significant factors in the firm's decision
to hold her candidacy." Pet. App. 25a (emphasis supplied). As the proceeding comes to this Court, the critical
finding of the district court, affirmed by the court of
appeals, is that because of her sex, plaintiff was evaluated
less favorably than she would have been on the basis of
her personality standing alone.
That being so, the point of controversy here concerns
whether the less-favorable-evaluation-on-the-basis-of-sex
component of Price Waterhouse's decision-making process
was sufficient to make the difference between a partnership offer and the "hold" that actually occurred. Indeed,
the parties have focussed on where the burden of persuasion lies with respect to that point and the nature of that
burden.
However, as Price Waterhouse recognizes. ( Pet. Br. at
21), in order to resolve that controversy, it is necessary first to determine the basic parameters of a viable
Title VII cause of action. In order to know who has what
burden of persuasion here one first has to know whether
a showing that an employer maintains a selection process
that in some respect is biased against women, and subjects
women to that process, makes out a violation of Title VII.
Price Waterhouse argues that such a showing is not sufficient; according to the employer, Title VII focusses only
upon the employment decision ultimately made, and does
not concern itself with the fairness of the process through
which that decision is made. Pet. Br. at 20-27. This contention is simply incorrect. And not surprisingly Price
Waterhouse's proposed answer to the analytically separate

!
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question as to the relevance of proof that any sex differenti ation in the evaluation process did not cause the
plainti ff any economic loss-w hich rests on the employer's
false premi se-is incorre ct as well.
(c) As we unders tand Price Waterh ouse's position, the
employer would agree that the plainti ff has made out a
Title VII case where an illegiti mate consid eration is one
of several reasons for an employment decision as long as
that reason was determinative, either independently or
in combination with other, legitim ate reasons.
Thus, for example, if an employer were considering
three employees for discharge due to economic conditions
-a woman who was a fully competent employee, a woman
who was not a fully competent employee, and a man who
was the least competent employee of the three- and discharge d the less competent of the two women, Price
Waterh ouse would agree that a finder of fact could infer
that the employer had "mixed motive s"; the employer did
not regard being a woman alone as sufficient for discharge, but the employer did treat being a woman as a
negativ e consideration in the evaluation process. Since it
is clear that it was "because of" that negativ e consideration-h er gende r- ( although also because of her lack of
competence) that the less competent of two women was
discharged, Price Waterh ouse would recognize that Title
VII had been violated. Cf. Phillips v. Martin Marietta
Co., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam).2
2 In light
of the argume nt made by Price Waterho use with regard
to the burden of persuas ion issue presente d here (Pet. Br. at 2936), it is importa nt to note that the situatio n delineat ed by this
example is quite separate from one in which the claim that there
is a nondisc riminato ry reason for the discharg e (or for any other
employm ent decision ) is pretextu al.
A pretextu al explana tion is, as this Court has. explaine d, one
which is "a coverup ". McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 805 ( 1973). See also, Webste r's New World Diction ary 1127
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This case (like most mixed motive cases) presents a
more complex variant of the hypothetical situation just
discussed. In this case the district court found that Price
Waterhouse has set up an evaluation system which considers not two considerations but many in deciding upon
promotions; that gender is included in that set of considerations as a negative factor of "significant" weight; and
that since the system is a qualitative one leaving ample
room for informed discretion, it is not possible to quantify the effect of gender in any particular situation. And
contrary to our hypothetical, in a case like this it is not
possible to determine the precise impact of the gender
consideration simply by comparing otherwise similarly
situated individuals; the pertinent considerations are too
complex, as indicated by the district court's conclusion
that the plaintiff had not identified any men sufficiently
similar to her in all pertinent respects to serve as an ap(2d College Ed.) (defining "pretext" as "a false reason or motive
put forth to hide the real one, excuse" and as a "coverup; front").
The concept o.f "pretext" thus concerns an alleged dissonance between an employer's explanation of his motives and his motives
in fact.
In a mixed motive situation, the nondiscriminatory motive may
be pretextual or not, depending upon whether the employer also
acknowledges the illegitimate, discriminatory motive. If, in the
above example, the employer insisted that his only criteria for discharge was incompetence, that would be a pretextual explanation,
since an incompetent man was retained. If, on the other hand, the
employer acknowledged his true mixed motives, there would be no
pretext. The employer would, however, be liable, even on Price
Waterhouse's theory in this case, although the nondiscriminatory
motive was not pretextual and was itself another determinative
reason in making the discharge decision.
In short, the problems of pretext and of mixed motivation have
little to do with each other. Cases dealing with pretext (e.g., McDonnell Douglas, supra, and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981)) concern the determination
of what the employer's motivation really was, while the mixed
motive problem arises only once that determination is made and
concerns the propriety of liability and of relief once the facts are
established.

9

propriate test of the impact of gender upon the promotion
decision. Pet. App. 49a.

T

i

It is nonetheless true that, in this case as in our
hypothetical, the employer treated gender as a negative
consideration in the process of making an employment
decision, and in that sense based its evaluation upon an
illegitimate consideration.3 And it is also undeniable that
the employer by doing so has created a situation in which
there is a significant risk that discriminatory considerations will in fact be determinative in particular situations,
a risk that would be absent if only legitimate factors were
considered in making promotion decisions.
Price Waterhouse's fundamental position in this case
proceeds from the premise that an employer is free to
employ such a tainted decisionmaking system, and is not
open to a Title VII suit by a woman (or a group of
women) subject to the system to enjoin its operation on
the ground that the system as such violates Title VII.
Pet. Br. at 27-28. According to the employer, only if the
sex-based consideration embedded in the decisionmaking
process were proven by the plaintiff in a particular case
to have played a "decisive role" in a specific employment
decision with adverse economic consequences would Title
3

i

..
I

Again, a hypothetical example may clarify this point. Price
Waterhouse might have instituted a more formal evaluation system,
providing for point rankings of the various candidates, based upon
different point values for different relevant qualities. If the employer assigned a number of negative points for being a woman, the
impact would be basically the same as the sex stereotyping in this
case; the only difference would be that the impact would be precisely
measurable, because the entire system would be based on quantifying considerations. Cf. Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts
v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 262 n.7 (1979); Regents of University of
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 267-77 (1978). In that hypothetical, as in this case, gender would be a negative, although not necessarily a determinative, factor in every evaluation of a woman, and
the employer would be basing its evaluation upon both legitimate
and illegitimate factors.

10
VII be violated. Pet. Br. at 29; see also id. at 23; Brief
of the United States as Amicus Curiae (Gov. Br.) at
9-10. There is no basis for this position under Title VII,
as we now show.
I. Title VIl's Language

Section 703 (a) (1) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 (a)
(1), forbids "discriminat[ing ] against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex or national origin." As this Court
recently held,
The phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" evinces a congressional intent " 'to strike
at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men
and women" in employment.' Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,
707, n.13 (1978). [Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,
U.S. - , 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2405 (1986) .]
Just as "a hostile or offensive environment for members
of one sex is [an illegal] arbitrary barrier to sexual
equality'" and therefore an illegal "condition of employment" (Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. at
2406, quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th
Cir. 1982)), so the requirement that an employee submit
to a decisionmaking process that treats men and women
disparately on the basis of their gender and subjects
women but not men to an added risk of an adverse outcome is, in and of itself, an unlawful condition of employment.4
That the statute proscribes "discriminating . . . with respect to"
employment reinforces. the conclusion that Congress intended to
reach not simply the end-result of decisionmaking processes but
those processes themselves. Creating a promotion system that is
less favorable to women assuredly discriminates against women
"with respect to" promotion, even if it is not possible to trace any
particular promotion decision to the sex-based aspect of the promotion evaluation process.
4

---
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Even more clearly, the other pertinent substantive section of Title VII, § 703(a) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2)
(a) (2), reaches employment decisionmaking that relies
upon a sex-based factor as a negative consideration. That
section makes it unlawful for employers to
limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, race, or national origin.
Quite evidently, § 703 (a) (2) in terms proscribes
decision-making processes that disadvantage women by
placing a negative weight on femaleness. Such a process,
as we have already seen, "tends to deprive [women] of
employment opportunities ... because of sex" by creating
a higher risk for women than for men that employment
opportunities will be denied. As this Court stated so emphatically in one of its earliest Title VII cases:
The objective of Congress in the enactment of [ this
section of] Title VII is plain from the language of
the statute. . . . It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have
operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of
[male] employees .... What is required by Congress
is the removal of artificial barriers to employment
when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate
on the basis of racial or other impermissible classifications. [Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
430-31 (1971).]

l

It is because Congress was concerned not simply with the
end-result of employment decisions but also with purging
the employment decisionmaking process of sex-based and
( race-based) considerations that " [ t] he statute speaks
not in terms of jobs and promotions, but in terms of
limitations and classifications that would deprive any in-
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dividual of employment opportuniti
es." Connecticut v.
Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 448 (1982) (em
phasis in orig ina l) .5
In addition, § 703 (a) (2) proscribes
pra ctic es tha t do
not adversely affect any par ticu lar
employment opportunity, but tha t do "adversely affect
[a women's] ... sta tus
as an employee." To apply an eva
luation process tha t
gives weight to sex stereotypes adv
ersely affects a woman's stat us in the workplace simply
by giv ing credence
to those negative stereotypes, much
as ma nta inin g raceseg rea ted bathrooms in a workplace
would do. In this
instance, as in ma ny others, the
eva lua tion process resulted not only in a dec isio n-t o
place the pla inti ff on
"hold" wit h respect to par tne rsh
ip- but also in wri tten
and ora l stat em ent s reg ard ing the
pla inti ff's stre ngt hs
and weaknesses as an employee.
Sex-stereotyping stat ements "ad ver sely affect [a women's
] sta tus as an employee" even when the decision is fav
ora ble -an d ass ure dly
do so when the decision is unf avo
rab le-b y conveying to
fellow employees and to ma nag ers
a gen der -tai nte d view
of the individual's wo rth as an emp
loyee.
The foregoing rea din g of § § 703 (a)
( 1) & (2) is not
alte red in any way by the fac t tha
t Titl e VII provides
tha t, to act unl awf ully an employ
er mu st act "because
of such individual's ... sex." Tha
t phr ase does not requi re tha t a sex-based (or race
-based) consideration
"ca use " an adverse employment dec
ision in the same sense
5 Grig
gs v. Duk e Pow er Co., supra, and
Con nect icut v. Teal, supra, wer e both disp arat e imp act
cases. But it is plai n that Congres s in ena ctin g Titl e VII was
equa lly inte rest ed in root ing out
barr iers to equ al opp ortu nity that
are not dire ctly sex- base d but
hav e a disp arat e imp act upon mem
bers of one gen der and decisionmak ing processes that plac e wom
en at a disa dva ntag e on dire ctly
gen der- base d grou nds . Put ano ther
way, if the test s at issu e in
Grig gs and Teal had dedu cted five
poin ts from the grad e of ever y
woman, ther e would have been no
disp ute, we susp ect, as to whe ther
thos e test s wer e inva lid as tend ing
to dep rive women of emp loym ent
opp ortu niti es; only beca use ther
e was no such exp licit link to
a
pros crib ed classification was ther
e a cognizable argu men t on the
emp loye r's side.
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that a physical act "causes" a physical injury. As a literal matter, and as a matter of human psychology, an
employer who takes action that is in part premised upon
a sex-based consideration and in part premised also upon
a legitimate consideration, has acted "because of ... sex"
(although because of other reasons as well). The employer's action is "on the basis of" and "takes into account"
sex as a factor that has been accorded some weight in
reaching the decision to act. Given the limits on our
knowledge of the wellsprings of human action it is difficult-if not impossible-to give more content to the concept of a discriminatory motive.
In sum, the statutory words demonstrate that "it would
be unlawful for defendant to put [an employee] at a disadvantage in the competition for promotion because of
[sex], as well as to actually deny ... the promotion for
this reason." Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1321 (8th
Cir. 1985) .6 Under this approach, because the unlawful
employment practice is the flawed decisionmaking process
itself and not simply its particular results, any causal
requirement runs between the unlawful motivation and
the process, and not between the unlawful motivation and
the ultimate decision. 7 And that link is in mixed motive
See id. at 1323 for a list of federal court of appeals cases adopting basically this same analysis. of the substantive reach of Title
VII. See also, for a commentary that many of those cases found
persuasive on this question as well as on the others in this case,
Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title Vll
Action, 82 Columbia L. Rev. 292 (1982).
6

7 So, for example,
"if an employer requires black employees to
meet a higher standard [than whites to get promoted], the statute
is violated even if [the blacks] actually meet [the higher standard]
and get the jobs in question." Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d at 1321-22;
see also, e.g., King v. Trans-World Airlines, Inc., 738 F.2d 255, 259
(8th Cir. 1984) (an interview process that asks women questions not
asked of men violates Title VII even if the defendant has legitimate
reasons for not hiring the plaintiff).
It is worth noting as well that in cases like this one, causation in
the sense we use that term in regard to physical acts is ordinarily
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cases almost always self-evident, since the discriminatory
evaluation process is by definition one made discriminatory by the very fact that tihe employer took orr is taking
sex-based considerations into a,ccount and is giving those
considerations a negative weight in its decisionmaking.
It is therefore simply untrue that the foregoing reading
of Title VII "make [s] illegal the existence of discriminatory thoughts and expressions," "prohibit[s] discrimination 'in the air' ", or "impose [s] liability for discriminatory animus without more". Pet. Br. at 21; Gov.
Br. at 9.8
II. Title VIl's Policies

Title VII's basic purpose is not simply to compensate
individuals for economic losses due to proscribed discrimination, but "to eliminate ... discrimination in employment based on [the proscribed factors]." H. R. Rep.
No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 ( 1963). For this reason, the concept of illegal discrimination incorporated in
the Act seeks to end any use of the proscribed consideration factors in making employment decisions. As one of
tihe floor managers of the bill explained:
To discriminate is to make a distinction, to make a
difference in treatment or favor, and those distinctions in treatment or favor which are prohibited by
not in dispute. For example, on the facts in this case as found by
the district court, the employer's conduct certainly caused Hopkins
to be subjected to a discriminatory promotion evaluation system,
and to be rejected for partnership pursuant to that system. The
question is not whether the defendant caused Hopkins injury, but
why, viz., with a motive forbidden by the statute, or with a legal
motive.
s For the reasons stated in the text, it is also plain that the legislative history quoted in support of the proposition that Title VII does
require a causal connection between an unlawful motive and a
proscribed employment practice (Pet. Br. at 24-26; Gov. Br. at
8-10) does not advance the inquiry. For we too recognize the need
for a causal link; the dispute is over the nature of that link, and
the quoted congressional statements do not speak to that dispute.

15

i

I

section [703] are those which are based on any .
of the forbidden criteria: race, color, religion, sex,
and national origin. . . . The bill simply eliminates
consideration of color [and other proscribed criteria]
from the decision to hire or promote. [110 Cong.
Rec. 7213, 7218 (1964) (remarks of Senator Clark).
See also, e.g., 110 Cong. Rec. 13088 (1964) (remarks
of Senator Humphrey).]
Consistent with this legislative history, this Court has
repeatedly stressed that:
the primary objective [of Title VII] was a prophylactic one ... [to] 'provide the spur or catalyst which
causes employers and unions to self-examine and to
self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so
as possible, the last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in this
country's history. [Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405,417 (1975).]
See also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra, 401 U.S. at
429-30; Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers
Union, 451 U.S. 77, 93 ( 1981) ; EEOC v. Associated Dry
Goods Corp, 449 U.S. 590, 595 ( 1981) ; Tearnsters v.
United States, supra, 431 U.S. at 324, 357-364.
The reading of Title VII we suggest forwards the
fundamental "prophylactic" purpose of the statute: employment decisionmaking free of the proscribed discriminatory considerations. In contrast, on Price Waterhouse's view of the statute, employers are free to violate
that norm with impunity in a large number of instances,
becoming liable even for injunctive and declaratory relief only where the plaintiff succeeds in demonstrating
that a proscribed discriminatory consideration was determinative ( although not necessarily solely determinative)
in a particular employment decision. Such an approach,
far from encouraging employers to "self-examine and
self-evaluate their employment practices" ( Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, supra, 422 U.S. at 417), encourages
continuation of the more subtle forms of employment
discrimination.

far
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Indeed, the result of such tainted decisionmaking processes is twofold: First, women and minorit ies are discouraged in pursuin g career opportu nities, simply by
reason of being treated dispara tely from, and more
harshly than, their fellow workers. And second, there are
certain to be numero us instance s in which the proscribed
discrim inatory consideration embedded in the decisionmaking process was in fact determi native, but in which
the difficulty of reconst ructing the employer's decisionmaking process with sufficient precision to prove that
impact proves insurmo untable . It is undoubtedly for these
very reasons that Congress in enactin g Title VII created
a cause of action for gender-biased decisionmaking on
employment matters . 9
III. Analogous Cases In This Court

The reading of Title VII suggested above is further
buttress ed by this Court's approach in cases arismg
under the Constitution, and under the Nation al Labor
Relation s Act.
This Court has recognized first of all that the claim
that a decisionmaking process does not meet applicable
constitu tional standar ds is sufficient to state a cause of
action, and that questions relating to the connection between that flawed process and the decision actually made
are matters that go to remedy, not liability.
stereotyp ing was
9 In this case, the district court found that sex
not simply "a" facto,r in Price Waterho use's decisionm aking process
but a "significa nt" factor in that process. Pet. App. 25a. It is thus
not necessary in order to affirm the decision below for this Court
to decide whether any reliance on gender-b ased decisionm aking
creates liability under Title VII, or whether there is room for a
de minimis rule.
We hasten to add that it is common ground that it is not sufficient
to demonst rate simply that one or more of the individua ls in a decisionma king capacity harbors discrimin atory views; some factual
basis for inferring that those views were given operative weight
with regard to an employm ent decision is necessary .
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For example, in Carey v. Piphus,
435 U.S. 247 (19 78) ,
while " [t] he Dis tric t Cou rt held tha
t ... [plaintiffs] had
been suspended wit hou t procedura
l due process," the re
was no finding as to wh eth er the
plaintiffs would have
been suspended if procedural due
process had been accorded. Id. at 251-53. The Cou
rt, proceeding on the
pre mis e tha t liab ility had been esta
blished, approved a
lower cou rt ruli ng tha t " 'if [the
def end ant s] can prove
on rem and tha t [the plaintiffs]
would have been suspended even if a pro per hea ring had
been hel d,'" the n no
damages for inju ries caused by the
suspension would be
available. Id. at 260.;10 The Cou rt
added, however, tha t
"persons in [pla inti ff's ] position mig
ht well recover damages for me nta l and emotional
dis tres s caused by the
denial of procedural due process"
( id. at 262 ), and held
tha t because "tihe fac t rem ain s
tha t [pla inti ffs] wer e
deprived of the ir rig ht to procedura
l due process," nomina l dam age s are available even
if no act ual dam age s
could be proven ( id. at 266-67)
.11 See also Memphis
Com mu nity School Dis tric t v. Stachu
ra, - - U.S. - - ,
106 S. Ct. 2537 (1986) (Carey prin
ciples apply to employment decisions impermissibly
tak ing into account
Fir st Am end men t act ivit y). Cf.
LeB oeu f v. Ramsey,
503 F. Supp. 747 (D. Mass. 198 0).
Similarly, in Mt. Hea lthy School Dis
-trict v. Doyle, 429
U.S. 274 (19 77) , the Cou rt, afte
r recognizing tha t a
school teac her was discharged in
par t because of his
"communication [to a rad io stat
ion ] protected by the
10 The low
er cou rts had gran ted inju ncti ve
and decl arat ory relief ( id. at 252) ; it is perm issib
le to gran t such relie f, of cour se,
only afte r liab ility has been esta blis
hed.
1,1 The Car ey Cou
rt iden tifie d the inte rest s serv ed
by the constitu tion al due proc ess requ irem
ent to be som ewh at sim ilar to
thos e disc usse d abov e with rega
rd to a Titl e VII viol atio n for
gen der- tain ted deci sion mak ing:
"to, convey to the indi vidu al a
feel ing that the gov ernm ent [in
this inst ance , the emp loye r] has
deal t with him fair ly, as well as
to min imiz e the risk of mis take n
dep riva tion s of prot ecte d inte rest s."
Id. at 262.
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First and Fourteenth Amendments," ( id. at 284), indicated that it was sufficient to establish a constitutional
violation for the plaintiff to demonstrate that the communication "was a 'substantial factor'-or, to put it in other
words, that it was a 'motivating factor' in the Board's
decision," (id. at 286-287) .:1 2 The Court then turned to
the separate remedial question of whether "Doyle is
entitled to reinstatement with backpay ;" viz., to the
question of whether there was a "constitutional violation
justifying remedial action." Id. at 284, 285; emphasis
added. And the Court concluded that the normal reinstatement with backpay remedy would not follow from ·
the constitutional liability if-and only if-the defendant
demonstrated that the unconstitutional decisionmaking
process was not responsible for plaintiff's loss of his job;
viz., that the plaintiff would have been discharged in any
1 ,2 The Mt. Healthy Court did not spell out the underlying reasons for describing the elements of the constitutional cause of action in this way. However, a few years before, in Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972), this Court had explained the relationship between the First Amendment and public employee discharges for free speech :
[E]ven though a person has no 'right' to a valuable government benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely .... For if the
government could deny a benefit to a person because of his
constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise
of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited.

The essence of the constitutional violation alleged in Mt. Healthy
was that the School Board has acted upon one of those "reasons
upon which the government may not rely." Once this was proven,
under Perry the plaintiff had established a constitutional wrong.
See also Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977) (decided the same
day as Mt. Healthy) (because "racial discrimination is not just
another competing consideration", "proof that a discriminatory
purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision" is sufficient
"proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose" to show "a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.")
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event. Id. at 287.1~ See also Givhan v. Western Line
Consolidated School District, 439 U.S. 694, 416 ( 1979)
(referring to the Mt. Healthy burden-shifting rule as
dealing only with the question when "a public employee
must be reinstated") ; Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 281 n.14 ( 1978) ( Opinion of Powell, J.).
This Court has in addition approved a similar approach under the National Labor Relations Act. NLRB
v. Transportation Management Co., 462 U.S. 393 ( 1983),
reviewed an NLRB construction of § 8 (a) ( 3) of the
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3), the section proscribing
"discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment ... to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization." Under § 8 (a) ( 3) as construed by
the NLRB and approved by this Court, "to establish an
unfair labor practice the General Counsel need show by
a preponderance of the evidence only that a discharge is
in any way motivated by a desire to frustrate union
activity." 462 U.S. at 398-99. An unfair labor practice
is established if the employer in its decisionmaking process gives negative weight to the consideration that an
individual is a union adherent. The Board tihen permits
the employer to establish as an "affirmative defense"viz., as a basis for avoiding liability based upon a consideration other than failure to prove the cause of
action ( C.A. Wright & A.R. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure: Civil § 1270 at 289-92 and § 1271 at 313-16)
-that the employer would have taken the same action
absent the illegal motivation, and thereby to avoid a
coercive order.
While permitting this "affirmative defense"-burden
shifting approach, the Court made clear that the· burden
,rn Of course, as Memphis Community School District v. Stachura
supra, was later to confirm, even if there were no reinstatement
or back pay available, nominal and, where appropriate, actual compensatory damages for the constitutional violation would still lie,
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shifts to the employer only after all the elements of an
unfair labor practice-viz., after the factors necessary to
establish that " [ t] he employer is a wrongdoer"-hav e
been made out. 462 U.S. at 401-02. And the Court approved this approach as a permissible variant upon an
alternative the Board was also free to adopt; viz., the
alternative of providing some relief, but not reinstatement and backpay, where the unfair labor practice was
proven but the employer could demonstrate that the
charging party was not economically injured thereby. Id.
at 402.14
IV. The Common Law of Causation

Contrary to the argument pressed by the United States
(Gov. Br. at 10-16), the construction of Title VII we
advocate is in no way at odds with modern concepts of
14 The Board, of course, has wide discretion in determining what
remedies, if any, to provide once an unfair labor practice has been
adjudicated. See NLRB v. Food Store Employees Local 347 (Beck's,
Inc.), 417 U.S. 1, 8 (1974). In approving the "affirmative defense"
approach as an alternative to providing at least some remedy for
an adjudicated unfair labor practice, the Court in Transportation
Management did not deal with the matter de nova but rather recognized the wide berth the NLRB is accorded in the area of remedying unfair labor practices.
It was our view, when Transportation Management was decided
(see Brief of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organizations as Amicus Curiae in Transportation Management, at 12-21) and remains our view, that to refuse to provide
at least prospective relief once it has been determined that an employer "is a wrongdoer" under the NLRA does not forward that
statute's purposes.
Under Title VII, unlike the NLRA, the Court is not reviewing
an administrative agency's construction of a statute but is construing an enactment in the first instance. In this circumstance
there are no deference considerations that preclude adoption of a
construction which most completely forwards the statute's purposes.
For the reasons discussed previously in the text, with regard to
Title VII that construction is one that views liability as established,
and appropriate relief available, on a showing that a proscribed
consideration was taken into account in the decisionmaking process.
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causation in tor t law.1'5 Ra the
r, it is now quite widely
accepted: ( a) tha t approaches
to cau sat ion which depend
upon ans we rin g hypothetical fac
tua l questions are to be
avoided in fav or of analyses
tha t view wh at actually
happened and ask only wh eth er
the def end ant 's conduct
wa s a "su bst ant ial fac tor " in bri
ngi ng abo ut the inj ury ;
(b) tha t cau sat ion -in -fa ct issues
can not be determined in
a policy vacuum, but mu st be
considered wit h an eye
tow ard the purposes of the sub
sta nti ve norm at issue,
and par tic ula rly tow ard wh eth
er tha t norm was intended
to avoid the ris k of inflicting
inj ury as well as to avoid
the infliction of act ual inj ury ;
and ( c) tha t for var iou s
policy-related rea son s it ma y be
app rop ria te to tra nsf er
the bur den of proving tra dit ion
al but -fo r cau sat ion fro m
the pla int iff to the defendant.
(a) While the Un ited Sta tes
derives its "sufficient
cause" concept fro m a few fai
rly recent tor t law commentaries, tha t concept is in
fac t both nar row er and
differently focussed tha n the con
cept most commonly accepted today. 1 '6 Thus, the most
widely rea d tex t on tor ts
recognizes (al bei t grudgingly) tha
t
•115

The disc ussi on of cau sati on
con cep ts in the brie f for the
Uni ted Sta tes is exc elle nt and
acc ura te as far as it goes.
We
the refo re take tha t disc ussi on
as a dep artu re poi nt and sho
w in
the tex t tha t the "suf fici ent cau
se" ' con cep t the gov ern men t sug
ges ts
is muc h nar row er tha n the cau
sati on con cep ts cur ren t in tor
t law
toda y.
One poi nt bea rs not ing in this
reg ard : It is far from clea r
tha t
tort Jaw cau sati on con cep ts are
an app rop riat e ana log y in the
pre sent con text . And, in fact , in
developing the law in the oth
er sub stan tive are as tha t turn upo n
the mot ive wit h whi ch an emp
loye r
or gov ern men t took detr ime ntal
acti on, this Cou rt has not gen
eral ly reas one d on the bas is
of common law tor t cau sati on
concep ts. In the end, we believe
reas oni ng of the kin d pre sen ted
her etofo re in this brie f, bas ed upo
n the par ticu lar stat uto ry sch
eme and
tak ing into acc oun t the par
ticu lar role of hum an mot ivat
ion in
dec isio nma king , is mo re per
tine nt tha n common law idea
s of
cau sati on.
:ie The sug ges tion at one poi
nt in the Uni ted Sta tes' brie
f tha t
the "suf fici ent" cau se con cep t
is the one app lied by this Cou
rt in
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a broader rule [than the "but for" rule] . . . has
found general acceptance. The defendant's conduct is
a cause of the event if it was a material and substantial element in bringing it about. . . . It has been
considered that "substantial factor" is a phrase sufficiently intelligible to furnish an adequate guide ...
and that it is neither possible nor desirable to reduce
it to any lower terms. [W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R.
Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on The Law
of Torts 267 ( 5th Ed. 1984) ] .1•1
Mt. Healthy and Transportation Management (Gov. Br. at 21) is
mistaken.
In the first place, in those cases the Court concerned itself with
describing the constitutional or statutory violation in terms of
what actually motivated the employer; that, presumably, is why
the term "motivating factor" was used in both cases, to describe
a factor that was in fact one of the actor's motives. The government's analysis, in contrast, requires determination of hypothetical
issues concerning whether a legitimate motive would have been
"sufficient" to cause the injury in question had the illicit motive
not played a role in the decision.
Moreover, nothing in Mt. Healthy or Transportation Management (or any other of this Court's relevant cases) purport to set
a threshold that excludes from the liability determination factors
that, in this case, were "significant" in the decisionmaking process,
but may have been neither necessary nor sufficient to the decision
standing alone. Rather, as we have demonstrated, a constitutional
violation on the one hand, or an unfair labor practice on the other,
can be made out simply by showing that an impermissible motive
played a significant role in the decisionmaking process; necessity
or sufficiency becomes relevant at the remedy stage, if at all.
;17 See, for the seminal articles from which this now-dominant approach was derived, Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 Stan.
L. Rev. 60 (1956); Green, The Casual Relation Issue, 60 Mich. L.
Rev. 543 (1962).
Malone, for example, argues. at some length that there is no
judicial support for the proposition that the "substantial factor"
test should be limited to situations in which "the force set in motion by the defendant would have been sufficient to produce the
damage alone". Malone, 9 Stan. L. Rev. at 90-91:
It is difficult to appreciate how the limitation in question
serves any purpose of administration or policy. . . . [For ex-
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This approach avoids-and in large measure is deemed
superior to the alternatives on the ground of avoidingthe hypothetical, counter-to-fact nature of the "but for"
and "sufficient" cause approaches, in which the trier of
fact "is invited to make an estimate concerning facts
that concededly never existed." Malone, supra, 9 Stan.
L. Rev. at 67; see also W. Kee~on et al., s-upra, at 265.
( b) The "substantial factor" formulation was developed, in large part, in recognition of the proposition that
"in the law 'cause in fact' ( as it was once called), like
proximate cause, is in the end a functional concept designed to achieve human goals." Calabresi, Co!Merning
Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 69, 107 ( 1975). In particular, the "substantial factor" formulation permits factfinders to adjust the tightness of the required relationship between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's
injury to reflect the strength and the nature of the policy
expressed in the relevant legal rule. See Malone, supra,
9 Stan. L. Rev. at 91 & passim. As such, the "substanital factor" approach reflects a broader recognition that
cause concepts cannot be articulated in a policy vacuum:
The question in a particular case as to whether
the relationship between the defendant's conduct and
the plaintiff's harm is close enough to warrant application of the pertinent rule of law requires the court
to determine whether the rule was designed to protect against the type of injury suffered by the plaintiff. This answer is influenced by the court's reading

1

ample], [i]f the fire started by plaintiff was sizeable and
merges with another fire, why must the court require the jury
to make an estimate at plaintiff's risk as to whether defendant's fire would have worked the same destruction unaided?
If the flames he caused to be put in motion were actively playing a part, is it not enough to inquire whether that part was
sufficient to warrant an imposition of liability? This can be
adequately expressed through the use of the term "substantial" .
. . . No further safeguard is needed. [Id.]
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of how "exact ing" or strict the rule of law is. Moreover, where the defend ant's act is intenti onal rather
than negligent, the courts are apt to be satisfied with
a relationship more tenuou s than one they would
otherwise require. The willingness of courts in the
tort area to view 'cause- in-fact ' from a goal oriente d
perspective and to shape it to respond to changi ng
social needs is reflected in myriad decisions, rangin g
from the well-known Summe rs v. Tice 33 Cal. 2d
80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) to recent developments in the
products liabilit y field fashion ing novel theories of
enterp rise and marke t share liabilit y to provide recoveries not contemplated by traditio nal causati on
doctrine. [Brodin, supra, 82 Col L. Rev. at 313-14.]
Of particu lar relevance here is the stress in the recent
tort case law on identif ying the risk to which the defendan t's actions improp erly exposed the plaintiff, and
above
adjusti ng the causati on concept ( as we argue
18
risk.
should be done under Title VII) to that
(c) As one of the ways of adjusti ng causati on concepts to the legal rule's underl ying policy, courts in tort
cases have altered the ordina ry burden of proof as to
causation. For example, Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80
(1948) involved a situati on in which there were two
neglige nt gunmen, each of whom shot at the plaintiff.
Because of the difficulty in establi shing which gun fired
the wounding bullet, the court placed on each defend ant
the responsibility of provin g that he was not the respon,i.s Perhaps the most notewor thy example s of this approac h are
the "chance of life" cases, in which the defenda nt's actions reduced
the chance that a plaintiff would survive when those chances were
already less than fifty percent. Rather than asking, as a "but for"
approac h would, whethe r absent the defenda nt's negligen ce, the
plaintiff would more likely than not have survived , several courts
have viewed the increase d risk of harm due to defenda nt's conduct
as sufficien t to demons trate that the defenda nt's negligen ce was a
"substa ntial factor" in causing the plaintiff 's death. E.g., Herskov its
v. Group Health Insurance, 664 P. 2d 474 (Wash. 1983); Hicks v.
United States, 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966).
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sible gunm an. This is just one of several exam
ples in
which recen t tort decisions shift ed the burd en
of proof
on caus ation to the defe ndan t because of the unfa
irnes s,
for vario us reasons, of placing that burd en on the
plain tiff. See also, e.g., Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 3
Cal. 3d
756 (197 0); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis.
2d 166,
342 N.W.2d 37 cert. denied 469 U.S. 826 (1984).19
•
Thus, even if it were not true, as we argue
above, that the
Mt. Healt hy/ Trans porta tion Mana geme nt appro
ach is best viewed
as shifti ng the burde n of persu asion on causa
tion only after liabil ity is estab lished , there is no insur moun table
comm on law barri er
to shifti ng the burde n to the defen dant at the
liabil ity stage for
many of the same policy r eason s that justif y, in
our view, regar ding
the cause of action to be estab lished witho ut
demo nstra ting an
effect upon a partic ular emplo ymen t decision.
See Trans porta tion
Manag em ent, supra, 462 U.S. at 403 ("The emplo
yer is a wron gdoer; he acted out of a motiv e that is decla red
illegi timat e by the
statut e. It is fair that he bear the risk that the
influe nce of legal
and illegal motiv es canno t be separ ated, becau
se he know ingly
creat ed the risk and becau se the risk was create
d not by innoc ent
activi ty but by his own wron gdoin g.").
It is worth notin g as well that there is yet
one mo,r e appro ach to
the mixed motiv e causa tion probl em that yields
basic ally the same
resul t argue d for in the text. That appro ach views
the probl em as
presenting a harm less error issue, in the same
sense that comp laints
about the bias of an admi nistra tive or judic ial
factfi nder, or relian ce
on imper missi ble evidence, raises such an issue
. Cf. Johns on v.
Reed, 609 F.2d 784 (5th Cir. 1980) .
Wher e harm less error issues are raised , whet
her in crimi nal or
civil law, the placin g of the burde n of proof
and the stand ard of
proof applie d depen ds prima rily on the natur
e of the proce dural
viola tion; the stron ger the norm violated, the
more likely it is that
the burde n of provi ng harm less error will be place
d upon the party
seeki ng to prese rve the tainte d result . See Chap
man v. California,
386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967 ); Unite d State s v. Argen
tine, 814 F.2d 783
(1st Cir. 1987) ; Haddad v . Lockh eed Calif ornia
Corp., 720 F.2d
1454 (9th Cir. 1983) and cases cited ; Price Bros.
Co. v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 629 F.2d 444, 446 (6th Cir. 1980
); cf. McCandless
v. Unite d State s, 298 U.S. 342 (1936 ).
In this instan ce, as we have seen, the very prem
ise of Title VII
is that sex-b ased or race-b ased decis ionm aking
is funda menta lly
unfai r to the indiv iduals affect ed and socially
destru ctive. Unde r
19
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The upshot of the foregoing foray into tort law is not
that this Court, in this case or any other, should attempt
to model the Title VII law of causation on the latest tort
law analysis. Rather, the point is that contemporary tort
law does not take the rigid approach to cause issues suggested by either Price Waterhouse or by the United
States, but instead develops doctrine in response to the
very sorts of considerations we argued earlier are pertinent under Title VII. And modern tort doctrine supports the conclusion implicit in Title VII itself: The
essentials of a cause of action under Title VII can be
established in a mixed motive situation by showing that
sex or some other proscribed consideration played a negative role in the decisionmaking process concerning a term,
condition, or privilege of employment. Whether or not
that adverse effect was enough to make a difference as to
a particular employment decision is a question going to
remedy and not to liability.
V. The Title VII Burden of Proof Issues Presented Here

As we have seen, this Court in Mt. Healthy created,
and in Transportation Management approved, rules
which allow a defendant who has committed a wrong to
demonstrate that the wrong does not warrant certain
relief. At the same time, those two cases explicitly approve placing the burden of persuasion on the defendant
who endeavors to take advantage of the opportunity to
avoid remedial relief. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287;
Transportation Management, 462 U.S. at 403. In effect,
the Court shifted to the defendant the very real risk that
those circumstances, it appears that shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant to prove, convincingly, that the defect in the
decisionmaking process was harmless would be justified, and that
in the absence of such proof the decision actually made could not
stand. In other words, the result should be the same as it would be
if a party were attempting to void the results of a decision made
by a judge proven to have taken race into account in reaching his
or her decision.
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it will be difficult to persuade a trier of fact as to what
would have happened if what actually happened had not
happened.
The Court has concluded, in other word. that the
wrongdoer seeking to escape providing the plaintiff relief
must at least "bear the risk of the uncertainty which
his own wrong has created." Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 265 ( 1946) ; see also Story Parchment Co. v. Patterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S.
555, 565 ( 1931) ; NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94
F .2d 862 (2d Cir.) ( L. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 304 U.S.
576 ( 1938). This uncertainty, it bears noting, is considerably greater where, as in these cases, human motivation rather than physical causation is in question;
while physical occurrences tend to follow rules of cause
and effect that are at least theoretically ascertainable,
the same cannot be said of the complexities of human
thought and behavior.
There is, in all these regards, no basis for distinguishing the situation under the Constitution and the NLRA
from that under Title VII. 20 The court of appeals decision in this case, however, could be said to go beyond the
language of Mt. Healthy and of Transportation Managernent in one respect: the court below held that a clear
and convincing standard of evidence applies.
We submit that, however the requirement is phrased,
in this species of cases, the burden of persuasion imposed
should be sufficient to assure as a practical matter that
20
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I

The suggestion by the United States (Gov. Br. at 23) that such
a defense is mandated by ,§ 706(g) of Title VII is surely in error.
The part of § 706(g) forbidding affirmative relief and back pay if
the employment decision was "for any reason other than discrimination" is modelled on§ l0(c) of the NLRA. Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419 n.11 (1975). And the parallel language
in § lO(c) was construed in Transportation Management as "not
meant to apply to cases in which both legitimate and illegitimate
causes contributed to the discharge .... " 462 U.S. at 401 n.6.
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the risk of uncertain ty is born by the wrongdoer. Tha~
for example, is the NLRB's practice.
Thus, the Board requires that the evidence presented
by the employer to prove that the same decision would
have been made through untainted decision-making must
be more than simply testimonial attestatio ns as to what
would have been done absent a discrimin atory motive.
See McLane / Western, Inc. v. NLRB, 827 F.2d 1423,
1425 (10th Cir. 1987); NLRB v. Searle Auto Glass, Inc.,
762 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1985); NLRB v. Horizon
Air Services, Inc., 761 F.2d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 1985);
NLRB v. Townsend and Bottum, Inc·., 722 F.2d 297, 302
(6th Cir. 1983). Similarly, where it is an established
policy that is relied upon to prove what would have happened in the absence of a discrimin atory motive, the
Board has generally required clear evidence that the
policy existed, that the policy applied to the situation at
hand, and, as well, that the policy was strictly and uniformly enforced. McLane / Western, Inc. v. NLRB, supra,
827 F.2d at 1425 & n.5; Airborne Freight Corp. v.
NLRB, 728 F.2d 357, 358 (6th Cir. 1984); A&T Manufacturing Co., 276 NLRB 1183 (1985); PYA / Monarch,
Inc., 275 NLRB 1194 (1985).
The "clear and convincing evidence" rubric used by the
court of appeals seems as well adapted as any other to
convey the standard that these cases actually apply, and
quite properly so. That standard focusses directly on the
two relevant factors in reducing the risk of uncertain ty
created by the employer's unlawful acts: the type of evidence presented ( "clear" rather than ambiguous) and the
degree of certainty that evidence conveys ( "convincing"
rather than equivocal). Where, as here, the appropri ate
alternati ve would be not a lower standard of proof but
eliminati ng the counter-to-fact proof altogether, the defendant is in no position to complain. See also Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 421 (backpay should be
denied under Title VII "only for reasons which, if applied
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generally, would not frustrate the central statutory purpose of eradicatin g discrimination throughou t the economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered
through past discrimina tion.").
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court
of appeals should be affirmed.
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